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Abstract—Uncoordinated charging of a rapidly growing num-
ber of electric vehicles (EVs) and the uncertainty associated with
renewable energy resources may constitute a critical issue for
the electric mobility (E-Mobility) in the transportation system
especially during peak hours. To overcome this dire scenario, we
introduce a stochastic game to study the complex interactions
between the power grid and charging stations. In this context,
existing studies have not taken into account the dynamics
of customers’ preference on charging parameters. In reality,
however, the choice of the charging parameters may vary over
time, as the customers may change their charging preferences. We
model this behavior of customers with another stochastic game.
Moreover, we define a quality of service (QoS) index to reflect how
the charging process influences customers’ choices on charging
parameters. We also develop an online algorithm to reach the
Nash equilibria for both stochastic games. Then, we utilize real
data from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO)
to evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithm. The
results reveal that the electricity cost with the proposed method
can result in a saving of about 20% compared to the benchmark
method, while also yielding a higher QoS in terms of charging
and waiting time. Our results can be employed as guidelines
for charging service providers to make efficient decisions under
uncertainty relative to power generation of renewable energy.
Index Terms—Electric vehicles, transportation electrification,
stochastic game, renewable energy, QoS.
NOMENCLATURE
A. Sets and Indices
i EV index.
m Charging station index.
t Time index.
T Time horizon.
M Number of charging stations.
Hm,t Set of EVs in the m-th charging station.
B. Variables
Pi,t Charging rate of EV i.
xm,t Power purchased from the grid for charging station
m at time t.
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ωi,j Probability of EV i choosing the j-th deadline.
C. Parameters
SOCi,t SOC of EV i at time t.
SOCfini Target SOC of EV i.
E
cap
i Battery capacity of EV i.
Edei Demand of EV i.
Efini Energy level of the battery when EV i leaves.
Pmaxi Maximum charging rate of EV i.
c Charging efficiency of the EV.
vi (ai) Departure (arrival) time of EV i.
fi Estimated finishing time of the charging of EV i.
rm,t Renewable power generation of the m-th charging
station at time t.
Pbaset Based load of the power grid at time t.
Ppeak Peak constraint of the power grid.
kt Electricity price at time t.
Qm,t Charging queue of charging station m at time t.
Zm,t Request penalty queue of charging station m at
time t.
Bi,t Waiting time queue of EV i at time t.
D. Operators
| · | Cardinality of set.
AT Transpose of matrix A.
Other notations are defined in the text.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electrification of transportation (E-Mobility) plays an im-
portant role in achieving the goals of the Paris agreement
enforced in 2016, which requires 1170 giga tons of CO2 from
cumulative emissions to be cut down during the 2015− 2100
period [1]. Under this trend, the deployment of EVs is regarded
as an important initiative to reduce CO2 emission from con-
ventional vehicles. Various policies have been made in many
countries in order to reach the vehicle market share of EVs
up to 30% by 2030 [2].
One of the key issues of deploying EVs is the driving
distance. However, with a large and rapidly growing number
of EVs, charging service providers in the transportation system
should be aware of the negative impact of uncoordinated
charging to the efficient and reliable operation of the power
grid. Uncoordinated large-scale EV charging can lead to
problems, such as increase in peak load and power quality
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2reduction [3]. To cope with this situation, researchers have
proposed various coordinated charging mechanisms (e.g., [4]–
[11]). These algorithms require various charging parameters,
including charging demand, arrival time, and departure time,
as inputs.
The EV charging management problem was studied in [4]–
[8], where the interaction between power grid and charg-
ing stations was considered. The authors in [4] presented a
mathematical model in order to minimize electricity cost for
charging EVs. Based on the framework in [4], the authors in
[5] applied model predictive control to jointly address optimal
power flow problem for managing charging tasks. Then, the
competition between charging stations may lead to a less
efficient charging management solution. Therefore, irrational
behavior of the charging stations was taken into account in [6].
The authors in [7] further studied the dynamic behaviors of
the charging stations and EV owners. The method of optimally
utilizing the charging capacity was proposed in [8]. On the
other hand, studies such as [9], [10] schedule the charging
of EVs without considering the power generation from the
grid. The authors in [9], [10] proposed a parameter called user
convenience, which is calculated from charging states of EVs,
and algorithms were proposed to maximize user convenience.
The authors in [11] further applied user convenience to the
charging management problem.
Integration of renewable energy resources into the trans-
portation system is another initiative in order to further reduce
CO2 emission. However, dealing with inherent uncertainty
associated with power generation from renewable energy
resources, such as solar panels and wind turbines, will be
a major issue for the charging management problem. Such
uncertainties were addressed in [12]–[19]. In [12], the authors
proposed an index, called competitive ratio, to design an
algorithm that can capture system uncertainty; however, the
competitive ratio needs the optimal offline solution. The au-
thors in [13] classified EVs with different priorities to manage
the uncertainty associated with renewable energy generation.
The multi-objective optimization was formulated to solve the
EV charging management problem with renewable energy
in [14]. The authors in [15]–[17] modeled the EV charging
management problem as Markov decision process (MDP). The
uncertainty associated with renewable power was addressed in
both power flow operation and charging management problem
by the authors in [18]. The charging management problem in
a charging station was formulated as a stochastic optimization
problem in [19].
For the studies [15]–[18], they showed that EV charging
management problem with the uncertainty of renewable energy
generation can be solved with MDP and obtained promising
results in terms of electricity cost. However, for utilizing
MDP, we need to model transition probabilities of the system
states (e.g., renewable energy generation or charging demand),
which are not readily available in practice. Thus, we rely on
predicted information. Unfortunately, such predictions have
often proven to be quite inaccurate [20]. For example, the
day-ahead prediction error in some days for renewable energy
generation may result in a large error due to the unpredictable
weather [20]. Therefore, designing an online algorithm for
EV charging management incorporating renewable energy
resources remains a big challenge and an important problem
to solve. Also, different from [12], [13], [19], we study
EV charging management problem among several charging
stations that requires cooperation between charging stations.
In addition, the dynamic behavior of EV owners or charging
stations during charging should be also considered. In [6],
irrational behaviors of the charging stations were modeled
by using prospect theory. Prospect theory was also used
to represent customers’ irrationally varying willingness of
participating in a demand response program [21]. Further-
more, the driving behaviors were incorporated in the driving
range estimation in [22]. The preferences of EV owners on
choosing charging stations and the preferences of charging
stations on choosing EV owners were jointly considered in
[7]. However, the dynamic behavior of EV owners with regard
to the charging parameters also plays an important role in
the charging management problem. Specifically, algorithms
designed in [4], [5], [9]–[11] are based on the parameters given
by EV owners. However, EV owners may change preference
on the charging parameters during charging and they will not
explicitly report this dynamic behavior to the charging stations.
Moreover, the dynamic preference on the charging parameters
may create conditions detrimental to reliability and resiliency
of the charging algorithms. Therefore, when designing the
algorithm for solving the charging management problem, it
should be taken into account that EV owners may change
the charging parameters while the EVs are in the charging
stations. Jointly considering and modeling the dynamics of
customers’ preference on charging parameters and uncertainty
associated with renewable energy resources, therefore demand
novel solutions.
To overcome the aforementioned challenges, in this paper,
we employ a stochastic game, a generalization of MDP, such
that we rely to a lesser extent on the forecasted information.
The forecasted information is only used to calculate the
charging status of EVs for EV owners. Also, EV owners may
dynamically change their preference on charging parameters.
To capture and characterize this dynamic behavior of EV
owners, we introduce a QoS index. More specifically, EV
owners attempt to obtain a better QoS during the charging
process by changing their preferences on charging parameters.
We then model varying choices of EV owners on charging
parameters under the uncertainty associated with renewable
power generation also as a stochastic game. In order to obtain
the Nash equilibria for both stochastic games, we design
an online algorithm. We evaluate the performance of our
proposed solution using real-world data from CAISO [23], that
provides all the historical data of the power system operation
in California. We show that the proposed algorithm yields
satisfactory results even if the prediction error is large.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold:
• In the paper, we address the EV charging management
problem incorporating the dynamic behavior of EV own-
ers in terms of changing the charging parameters. We
model the problem in the form of two stochastic games
where the amount of renewable power generated is the
stochastic variable.
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Fig. 1. System model used in this paper.
• We design an online algorithm to approach the Nash
equilibria for both stochastic games that leads to a
suboptimal solution. We further quantify the proximity
of the obtained solution to the optimal solution.
• We utilize real-world data to illustrate the performance of
the proposed algorithm in terms of total electricity cost
and QoS. The results show a reduction of about 20% in
electricity cost and a gain of about 12% in terms of QoS.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a transportation system consist-
ing of M charging stations each having renewable energy
resources (e.g., solar or wind power) as illustrated in Fig. 1.
All charging stations are connected to power grid and belong
to a single utility or single private enterprise. Then, the owner
of the charging stations collects the charging parameters from
EV owners and then schedule the charging tasks. We consider
a total of N EVs in the system. The charging management
problem is studied in a time horizon T with equal length
time slots t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In time slot t, Hm,t denotes the
set of EV indices in the m-th charging station. Moreover,
we assign EV owners the same indices as their EVs. Then,
Hm,t is used to represent the cardinality of the set Hm,t. We
use Ht =
⋃M
m=1Hm,t to denote the set of EV indices in all
charging stations.
For EV i, the state of charge (SOC) at time slot t is denoted
as SOCi,t, where 0 ≤ SOCi,t ≤ 1. Then, the capacity of EV i is
denoted as Ecapi . The target SOC, denoted as SOC
fin
i , indicates
the expected SOC at the departure time of EV i. We further
employ Edei and E
fin
i to denote demand of EV owner i and the
final battery energy level at departure time, respectively. Then,
ai denotes the arrival time of EV i, and vi is the corresponding
deadline (departure time). With these notations, we can write
Edei = E
fin
i − SOCi,aiEcapi . When EV i arrives in the charging
station, EV owner submits the charging parameters (i.e., ai,
vi, and SOCfini ) to the charging station.
In every time slot, EV i is assigned a charging rate, denoted
as Pi,t, which is restricted by the maximum charging rate, Pmaxi ,
based on the physical constraints of batteries. Other than the
charging rate, the charging station can broadcast the estimated
finishing time slot of the charging task, denoted as fi, to EV
owner i. Also, fi is always earlier than vi.
In the m-th charging station, the generation of renewable
energy at time t is represented as rm,t, and its capacity is
denoted as rcapm . However, the available renewable energy may
not be enough to meet the demand of all EVs. To overcome
this situation, the m-th charging station has to purchase an
amount of energy, xm,t, from the grid. The base load and the
peak constraint of the power grid at time t are Pbaset and P
peak,
respectively. Thus, we have
Pbaset +
M∑
m=1
xm,t ≤ Ppeak. (1)
Throughout this paper, we consider the following:
1) the charging station only has knowledge about the base
load and the generation of renewable energy at the
current time slot. The base load information and the
generation of renewable energy in the future can only
be forecasted; and
2) EVs do not discharge power to the grid (i.e., Pi,t ≤ 0),
since discharging infrastructure for the charging stations
is still expensive and discharging may accelerate battery
degradation rate; and
3) real-time pricing model is adopted. Therefore, charging
stations can only know the current electricity price.
To measure how the EV owners act accordingly to the
charging processes, a QoS index is required. Some charging
algorithms may let every EV spend long time on charging,
such that all EV owners wait long time for SOC reaching
SOC
fin
i . On the other hand, some algorithms select EVs with
priority, and therefore the waiting time of the EVs may vary
considerably. Hence, QoS for EV i can be defined as
QoSi = ln(1 + (fi − ai)) + ln (1 + (vi − fi)) . (2)
The first term indicates the charging time, which is the duration
for the SOC to reach SOCfini . The second term represents the
duration after SOC reaching SOCfini but before the deadline.
Normally, the total time for EVs staying in the charging
stations can be regarded as the summation of charging and
waiting time. Then, the power for charging EVs is determined
by the charging stations, and therefore the charging stations
can be regarded as the entities that allocate the charging
and waiting time for EVs. The EV owners can evaluate
the charging process with (2), and then adjust the charging
parameters to influence the power allocation of the charging
stations such that the QoS can be improved. The definition
of QoS is motivated by the objective function of the fair
rate allocation problem [24], where QoS in (2) represents the
fairness of the charging process.
III. STOCHASTIC GAME FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, there exists a two-level interaction
between three participants in E-Mobility, namely substation,
charging stations, and EV owners. The first level is between
the substation and the charging stations, and the second level
is between the charging station and the EV owners. In the
first level, the charging stations decide the amount of power to
draw from the power grid. Then, based on the available power,
the charging station can broadcast the estimated finishing
4charging time to EV owners. After receiving fi, EV owners
may want to change the charging parameters to improve QoS.
Because the uncertainty of renewable energy is a stochastic
variable, which can influence the decisions of the participants,
we use stochastic games to model interactions of both levels.
Specifically, we game the first level as a cost minimization
game and game the second level as a deadline selection game.
A. Cost Minimization Game
At the beginning of every time slot, the charging stations
have to decide the amount of power to draw from the power
grid. For achieving better E-Mobility, charging stations require
more power from the power grid than before; however, some
uncertainties may exist so that it is difficult for charging
stations to make decisions. Renewable power generation in the
future and future electricity prices are uncertain. Also, substa-
tions may increase the electricity price in the upcoming time
slot if charging stations consume too much power at current
time slot. To minimize the total electricity cost in a day, charg-
ing stations should interact with the substations. This interac-
tion can be modeled as a cooperative stochastic game, which
can be defined by a tuple Ξ1 = {kt, r,x, {1, 2, · · · ,M}, um}.
The main components of the game include:
• kt represents real-time electricity price at time t;
• r := {r1,t, · · · , rM,t} represents states of the renewable
power generation in all charging stations;
• x := {x1,t, · · · , xM,t} is the action of the charging
stations;
• {1, 2, · · · ,M} is the set of the players (i.e., charging
stations in the power grid); and
• um is the expected payoff function of the m-th charging
station corresponding to the selected action.
The m-th charging station observes the amount of renewable
energy generated, rm,t, and the real-time electricity price, kt,
at each time slot. Then, the charging stations have to decide
how much power to purchase from the grid (i.e., x). After
selecting the amount of energy to purchase from the grid, the
charging stations receive a payoff, um. After selecting x, the
charging stations receive a payoff, um. The payoff function
for the charging stations is the expected electricity cost in a
day, which can then be expressed as
um(xm,t,x−m,t) = E
[ T∑
t=1
kt
M∑
m=1
xm,t
]
, (3)
where x−m,t is the power drawn by the charging stations
except the m-th charging station.
In the cost minimization game, the charging stations aim to
minimize the expected electricity cost in a day; we can search
for the Nash equilibrium (NE) to reach this goal. NE for the
cost minimization game is defined as following:
Definition 1 (NE for the cost minimization game). In game
theory, NE is a state of the game that no player can benefit by
unilaterally changing strategies, while the other players keep
their strategies unchanged. The NE of the cost minimization
game Ξ1, denoted as x∗ := {x∗1,t · · ·x∗M,t}, such that for all
charging stations, it satisfies the following inequality:
um(x
∗
m,t,x
∗
−m,t) ≤ um(xm,t,x∗−m,t), (4)
where it implies that the electricity cost will be higher if the
m-th charging station does not choose x∗m,t.
The NE of the cost minimization game can be obtained by
solving the following optimization problem.
min
x
um(xm,t,x−m,t) (5a)
subject to E
[∑
t
(xm,t + rm,t)
]
≥
∑
i∈Hm,t
Edei , ∀m (5b)
Pbaset +
M∑
m=1
xm,t ≤ Ppeak, ∀t. (5c)
Constraint (5b) indicates that the amount of power purchased
from the power grid and the generated renewable power should
fulfill the total charging demand. Constraint (5c) represents
the capacity constraint, i.e., the total load in a power grid
should be bounded by Ppeak. The uncertainty associated with
the renewable power level is regarded as a random variable
and the total electricity cost should be calculated under this
uncertainty. Therefore, (5) is a stochastic optimization prob-
lem.
B. Deadline Selection Game
After deciding xm,t, the charging station allocates power to
EVs and then estimates fi for EV owners. The generation of
the renewable power in the upcoming time slots may influence
the outcome of fi, and therefore fi can be regarded as a
stochastic term to EV owners.
After receiving fi from the charging station, the EV owners
can calculate the waiting time. According to (2), the QoS may
be very low for some EV owners. Then, from the customers’
perspective, the EV owners may change their preferences on
the charging parameters, such that the power allocation to EVs
can be influenced. By doing so, the QoS can be improved.
For the charging parameters, ai is fixed when the EV arrives,
and therefore it cannot be modified. Thus, EV owners can
change vi and SOCfini according to the charging process. In our
model, EV owners can change vi in order to influence QoS.
This kind of stochastic interactions has not been incorporated
in previous studies. Similar to the cost minimization game,
the interaction between EV owners and the charging station
can be formulated as a non-cooperative stochastic game called
deadline selection game. The game can also be represented as
a tuple, Ξ2 = {f ,D,Hm,t, ui}, and the main components in
this stochastic game include:
• f :=
{
f1, · · · , f|Hm,t|
}
denotes the estimated finishing
time of charging broadcasted by the charging station;
• D := {dT1 , · · · ,dT|Hm,t|} is the action space for the EV
owners;
• Hm,t is the set of the players (i.e., EV owners with EVs
in the m-th charging station); and
• ui is the payoff function to the EV owner i.
5The charging station will broadcast the estimated finishing
charging time, fi, to the EV owner i after allocating the power
to EVs, and fi is defined as
fi =
{
t
∣∣∣∣ SOCi,t = EfiniEcapi
}
. (6)
After receiving fi from the charging station, the EV owner
i can take k different actions in the action space denoted as
dTi := {di,1 · · · di,k}, where the elements in the action space
revolve around vi. Then, let W := {ωT1 , · · · ,ωT|Hm,t|} denote
the vector of the mixed strategies of all EV owners, where, for
each EV owner i ∈ Hm,t, we have ωTi := {ωi,1 · · ·ωi,k} and
ωi,j is the probability corresponding to the choice of the j-th
pure strategy in dTi . Based on the response, the EV owners
will receive a payoff, which is the risk function denoted as
ui
(
ωTi ,ω
T
−i
)
=
∑
i∈Hm,t
E
 k∑
j=1
wi,j(SOC
fin
i − SOCi,t)efi−di,j
 ,
(7)
where ωT−i denotes the mixed strategy of the EV owners except
the i-th EV owner. Here, the risk function indicates the risk
level of fulfilling the demand under the chosen deadline for
the EV owner. The goal of EV owner i is to choose a mixed
strategy so as to minimize its payoff function as given in (7).
The NE for the deadline selection game can be obtained by
solving the following optimization problem
min
W
ui
(
ωTi ,ω
T
−i
)
(8a)
subject to
k∑
j=1
wi,j = 1, ∀i ∈ Hm,t (8b)
wi,j ≥ 0. ∀i ∈ Hm,t, j (8c)
The objective function of (8) aims to minimize the risk
function for the EV owners. Constraint (8b) indicates that
the sum of all probabilities over the action space should
be 1. Constraint (8c) ensures that wi,j is non-negative. The
uncertainty about renewable power generation may influence
the estimation on fi, and therefore it is also a stochastic
variable Thus, (8) is also a stochastic optimization problem.
IV. EQUILIBRIA FOR THE GAMES
From (5) and (8), it is clear that obtaining the Nash
equilibria is challenging due to the expectation term. Also,
there are many uncertainties such as the electricity prices,
states of the renewable power, and the demand of upcoming
EVs. To avoid the need of predicting such parameters, we will
design an online algorithm, for which we need to convexify
the original problems. We use virtual queues [25] to model the
charging process and then design an online algorithm based
on the virtual queue. The steps are explained in detail in this
section.
A. Cost Minimization Game Convexification
While searching the NE, the charging station has to meet
the demand from EV owners as stated in (5b). Therefore, for
the m-th charging station, we can construct a virtual queue to
address the current charging tasks. The charging virtual queue
can be expressed as
Qm,t+1 = max{Qm,t − cYm,t, 0}+ λm,t, (9)
where Ym,t = xm,t + rm,t is the total available energy for
charging EVs and λm,t is the demands of the EVs arriving at
time t. Quantity c is the charging efficiency.
Note that (9) does not include the terms accounting for the
deadline of charging tasks. Thus, we create another virtual
queue for the m-th charging station called request penalty
queue to address this issue, i.e.,
Zm,t+1 = max{Zm,t + ηmQm,t − cYm,t, 0}, (10)
where ηm is the parameter that can adjust the growth rate.
The Lyapunov function associated with the virtual queues
constructed above will be
Lchargt =
1
2
(
M∑
i=1
Q2m,t +
M∑
i=1
Z2m,t
)
. (11)
Then, we define a one-step conditional Lyapunov drift as
∆chargt = E
[
Lchargt+1 − Lchargt |Qm,t, Ym,t, λm,t
]
, (12)
where it represents the expected change in the Lyapunov
function from t to t + 1. In (12), it is difficult to capture the
probability density function of the renewable energy. There-
fore, instead of minimizing (12) directly, we can minimize its
upper bound. The individual upper bound of the virtual queues
will be
Q2m,t+1−Q2m,t ≤ 2cY 2m,t + 2Qm,t
(
λmaxm,t − cYm,t
)
, (13a)
Z2m,t+1−Z2m,t≤2Zm,t (ηmQm,t−cYm,t) + (ηmQm,t−cYm,t)2.
(13b)
Based on (13a) and (13b), Lyapunov drift can be bounded by
∆chargt ≤
M∑
m=1
E
[
1
2
(
2cY
2
m,t + (ηmQm,t − cYm,t)2
)]
+
M∑
m=1
E
[
Qm,t
(
λmax
2
m,t −cYm,t
)
+Zm,t (ηmQm,t−cYm,t)
]
= E [J1(x)|Qm,t, Ym,t, λm,t] (14)
where we regard λmax
2
m,t as a constant in (14). The detailed
derivation is provided in Appendix A.
Minimizing J1(x) ensures that E [J1(x)|Qm,t, Ym,t, λm,t]
is minimized by opportunistically minimizing an expectation
[26]. However, minimizing the Lyapunov drift upper bound,
∆chargt , can push the queue to a lower value. Therefore, we
further add another penalty term to ∆chargt , such that the
stability of the queues can be considered. Then, this is called
drift-plus-penalty algorithm. The drift-plus-penalty algorithm
states that we should greedily minimize the upper bound of
the drift-plus-penalty. Hence, we formulate an optimization
6problem based on the drift-plus-penalty algorithm as
P1 : min
x
J1(x) + kt
(
M∑
m=1
V chargm xm,t
)
(15a)
subject to Ym,t ≤ min
 ∑
i∈Hm,t
Pmaxi , Qm,t
 , ∀m (15b)
Pbaset +
M∑
m=1
xm,t ≤ Ppeak. (15c)
Here, the penalty term is the total electricity cost at time t,
and V chargm is the weight with respect to the electricity cost for
the m-th charging station. Thus, (15a) is a trade-off between
minimizing the queue-length drift and the penalty function.
Some charging stations may not receive enough power in the
current time slot, and therefore we put the remaining demand
into the penalty queue. If the electricity price is the same in
the next time slot, the charging station with huge value in the
penalty queue should receive more power in the next time slot.
This is because we minimize the expected difference of the
summation of two virtual queues as in (12). The optimization
problem P1 is a quadratic optimization problem, which can
be solved using interior-point method [27]. Constraint (15b)
ensures that Ym,t cannot exceed the amount that all EVs are
charged with Pmaxi or the current queue value. Eq. (15c) keeps
the base load with the power drawn from the grid less than
the peak constraint, Ppeak.
B. Deadline Selection Game Convexification
In the deadline selection game, the EV owners attempt to
change the deadline, while the risk level is considered. Then,
according to the definition of QoS in (2), charging time is
fixed after receiving fi, and EV owners can only change the
deadline to influence the waiting time. Therefore, for EV i in
the m-th charging station, we can also define a virtual queue
accounting for the waiting time, which can be written as
Bi,t+1=min
{
Bi,t+(SOC
fin
i −SOCi,t)
(
ωTi di−fi
)
, Bmaxi
}
, (16)
where ωTi di − fi represents the time difference between the
selected deadline and the estimated finishing charging time.
Also, in our design, the waiting time decreases if the SOC
approaches the desired SOC, SOCfini . Then, we restrict the
value of the virtual queue with Bmaxi . According to (16), we
can define another Lyapunov function as
Ldeadt =
1
2
∑
i∈Hm,t
B2i,t. (17)
The Lyapunov drift based on Ldeadt will be
∆deadt = E
[
Ldeadt+1 − Ldeadt |Bi,t, fi, SOCi,t
]
. (18)
As in Section IV-A, we use drift-plus-penalty algorithm, and
therefore we have to find the upper bound of the Lyapunov
drift. The upper bound of the Lyapunov drift, if only one EV
staying in the charging station, will be
B2i,t+1 −B2i,t ≤
(
ωTi di − fi
)2
+ 2Bi,t
(
ωTi di − fi
)
. (19)
The detailed derivation is provided in Appendix B. Based on
(19), we can then define
J2(W) =
∑
i∈Hm,t
((
ωTi di − fi
)2
+ 2Bi,t
(
ωTi di − fi
))
.
(20)
By combining (18) with (20), we can get following relation
∆deadt ≤ E [J2(W)|Bi,t, fi, SOCi,t] . (21)
Identical to the steps in Section IV-A, we minimize J2 and then
add a penalty term followed by drift-plus-penalty algorithm.
The problem can now be formulated as
P2 : min
w
J2(W)+
∑
i∈Hm,t
k∑
j=1
V deadi wi,j(SOC
fin
i −SOCi,t)efi−di,j
subject to (8b), (8c) (22)
The objective function of (22) is also a trade-off between
changing the deadline and the risk function. In other words,
EV owner i may choose to leave the charging station earlier
if fi is earlier than vi; however, the risk function goes higher
for this choice. That is, fi may be influenced by the renewable
power, such that SOC state may not reach SOCfini if EV owner
i wants to leave earlier. problem P2 is a quadratic optimization
problem, which can also be solved by using interior-point
method [27].
V. ONLINE ALGORITHM DESIGN
In order to search the Nash equilibria for both stochastic
games presented in Section III, we convexify the original
formulations to two optimization problems in Section IV. In
this section, we design an online algorithm based on these
formulations and then provide the theoretical analysis.
A. Finishing Charging Time Estimation
In the deadline selection game, the charging station will
broadcast fi for every EV owner. Hence, before introducing
the algorithm in detail, we discuss how the charging station can
estimate fi. In this case, we need the aid of the forecasted base
load information. Also, the future electricity price is hard to
be forecasted such that it is unknown to the charging stations.
Hence, we can only assume the electricity price is the same
in the future. This assumption is only used for estimating fi
for EV owners. We can then use the following remark to get
the idea of estimating the finishing charging time.
Remark 1. The optimal solution of EV charging problem
with the same cost function is to balance the load pro-
file after charging [11], [28]. That is, the total charging
demand should be distributed to the time slots from t to
t′ = {argmin vi|i ∈ Ht}. With the based load information
and the charging demand, fi for EV owners can be estimated.
B. Stochastic EV Charging Management Algorithm
At the beginning of the time slot, each charging station
observes the current base load and the current generation
of renewable energy information. A charging station also
7determines the set of EVs and the corresponding charging
demand in the charging station. With this information, the
charging stations solve Problem P1 to determine the amount
of power to draw from the grid by applying numerical opti-
mization algorithms [27]. The virtual queues Qm,t and Zm,t
can be updated with (9) and (10) according to the solution of
Problem P1, respectively. After knowing the available energy
for charging EVs, the charging station decides which EV
can be charged. However, in this paper, we do not focus on
selecting EVs to be charged, as the literature offers many
solutions to this aspect. Therefore, we employ the idea of
the earliest deadline first (EDF) method as in [28], where the
EDF method assigns the charging rate to EVs according to the
deadline. After receiving power from the charging station, the
SOC of EV i can be updated as
SOCi,t+1 = SOCi,t + c
Pi,t
Ecapi
. (23)
The charging station then estimates fi for EV owners based
on the Remark 1 in Section V-A. With the updated SOC
information and fi, EV owners can decide to shift their
deadline by solving Problem P2. The deadline can then be
updated using
vˆi = {di,k|k = argmax ωi,k}. (24)
The Bi,t can be updated based on the solution of Problem
P2. Also, the charging station has to collect the charging
information of EVs, which arrive at time t, at the end of the
time slot. Based on the selection of the EV owners, the m-th
charging station updates the V chargm as
V chargm =

(1− α)V chargm , if∑i∈Hm,t(vˆi − vi) < 0,
(1 + α)V
charg
m , if
∑
i∈Hm,t(vˆi − vi) > 0,
V
charg
m , if
∑
i∈Hm,t(vˆi − vi) = 0,
(25)
where α ≈ 0. The intuition of (25) is that charging stations
decrease the trade-off term to purchase more power from the
grid if most of the EV owners wish to leave earlier, and
vice versa. The steps repeat until the time slot reaches T .
On the basis of the discussion above, we summarize the steps
in Algorithm 1.
C. Performance and Computation Complexity Analysis
After designing the online algorithm in Section V-B, we
analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm in this
section. In Algorithm 1, P1 and P2 are convex optimization
problems, and therefore the solution of P1 and P2 will
converge to the optimal solution by utilizing the numerical
algorithms from [27]. However, both (5) and (8) are stochastic
optimization problems, and therefore the optimal solutions of
P1 and P2 can be the sub-optimal solutions of the stochastic
optimization problems. Hence, we need to show the relation
between the solutions of P1 and P2, and the solutions of (5)
and (8) , respectively.
We first show the relation between the optimal solution
of P1 and (5). Let λi,t, rm,t, and kt be independent and
Algorithm 1: Stochastic EV Charging Management Algo-
rithm
Input: N EVs with their information
Output: xm,t, Pi,t, vˆi
1 for t = 1 to T do
2 Determine Hm,t and Edei at time t
3 Get the real-time electricity price information at time
t
4 Solve Problem P1
5 Update virtual queue with (9) and (10)
6 Select which EVs to be charged by applying EDF
7 Use (23) to update SOC information
8 Estimate fi based on the Remark 1
9 Solve Problem P2 and choose vˆi with (24)
10 Update virtual queue with (16)
11 Charging stations collect the charging information of
upcoming EVs
12 Update the parameters based on (25)
identically distributed (i.i.d) over time horizon. Then, there
exists a randomized stationary policy such that
E
[
kt
M∑
m=1
x∗m,t
]
= c∗t , (26)
where c∗t is the optimal cost that can be achieved over time
slot t for (5), and x∗m,t is the corresponding optimal control
decisions.
Theorem 1. The total electricity cost in a day obtained by
solving Problem P1 is within O( 1V chargm ) to the NE of the cost
minimization game, which implies
T∑
t=1
c∗t ≤
T∑
t=1
E [ktg(x)] ≤ DT
V chargm
+
T∑
t=1
c∗t . (27)
The proof is provided in Appendix C.
The relation between the solution of Problem P2 and NE of
deadline selection game can be obtained in a similar manner
in Theorem 1. With Theorem 1, we can conclude that the
solutions of P1 and P2 are the -optimal solutions of (5)
and (8), respectively. Therefore, Theorem 1 implies that the
proposed algorithm can yield a solution close to the Nash equi-
libria of the cost minimization and deadline selection games
by increasing the trade-off parameters. However, increasing
V chargm represents that the charging stations will focus more
on minimizing the electricity cost. Then, increasing V deadi
increases the waiting time for EV owners.
Next, we analyze the computation complexity of Algorithm
1. Operations other than those in lines 3 and 8 are all linear.
We therefore focus on analyzing the computation complexity
of solving the optimization formulation in lines 3 and 8.
In lines 3 and 8, both Problem P1 and P2 are quadratic
convex optimization problems, and they can be easily solved.
For the traditional interior-point method, the complexity is
O(n log(n)), where n is the number of the variables [29].
Therefore, the computation complexity of solving Problem P1
8TABLE I
THE PARAMETER SETTING FOR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
N 25 50 100 200
M 2 4 8 16
Maximum Load (Kw) 100 200 400 800
Ppeak (Kw) 120 240 440 850
and P2 are O(M log(M)) and O(N log(N)), respectively.
The computation complexity of Algorithm 1 will then be
O(n log(n)), where n = max{M,N}. Thus, we can claim
that the overall complexity of Algorithm 1 is reasonably low.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We use real-world data from CAISO [23] to evaluate
the performance of the proposed algorithm. The data from
05/01/2018 is used. The base load information is normalized
by the maximum value. Then, we can get the solar and wind
energy capacity in California, such that we can calculate the
generation profile of unit renewable energy capacity. We also
employ real-time pricing data from [23]. Unless otherwise
specified, the simulation settings are as follows.
The total number of EVs is N , and they are randomly
assigned to one of the M charging stations, each of them
having 30 kWh solar and 10 kWh wind generation capacity.
The set of variables for different scenarios are provided in
Table I. The base load information is generated by multiplying
the maximum load in a day and the normalized load curve.
The EVs used in the simulation are all Nissan Leaf 2018,
each with a battery capacity of 40 kWh and a maximum
charging rate of 6.6 kW. The initial SOC values are randomly
and uniformly generated from the interval [0, 1], and the
EVs are assumed to be fully charged at the departure time.
The charging efficiency is set to 90%. The arrival time and
deadlines are generated randomly around 8 : 00 and 17 : 00,
respectively.
The time horizon is divided into 96 time slots with a length
of 15 minutes to represent a 24-hour period. Let V chargm be
350 for all charging stations, V deadi be 200 for all EV owners,
ηm be 1, and α be 0.001 as initial values. In the deadline
selection game, EV owners can choose between 5 actions,
{vi − 2, vi − 1, vi, vi + 1, vi + 2}, which means k = 5. Then,
Bmaxi is set to 20.
During the simulation, we compare our algorithm with the
offline charging cost minimization algorithm (OCCMA) in
[4] and the online charging scheduling algorithm (OCSA)
in [11] with the user convenience defined in [9] as the
benchmarks. The OCCMA obtains the real electricity price
and the real generation of renewable energy, and therefore
the OCCMA leads to the minimum electricity cost. Then,
we analyze two scenarios to OCSA denoted as OCSA-F and
OCSA-N. The forecasted renewable generation and forecasted
electricity price are available to the OCSA denoted as OCSA-
F. By contrast, OCSA-N only obtains the information of the
forecasted renewable generation. Forecasted electricity price is
generated by adding Gaussian noise (with zero mean and dime
variance) to the real-time pricing data. Comparison between
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Fig. 2. Charging cost comparison.
the OCSA-F and the OCSA-N provides some useful insight on
the influence of the forecasted electricity price to the OCSA.
Also, OCSA-N is similar to the methods in [9], [10].
A. Electricity Cost
In this part, we consider the electricity cost of different
scenarios listed in Table I. Then, the results are presented in
Fig. 2. Note that we normalized the electricity cost with the
result of the OCCMA.
According to the simulation results, the proposed algorithm
yields results very close to the optimal solution. The proposed
method leads to 7.07% higher cost compared to the optimal
solution. The OCSA-F yields a comparable performance as
the proposed method. However, the difference is 26.12% for
OCSA-N. By applying the proposed algorithm, we can save
about 20.00% of the electricity cost compared to OCSA-N.
The OCSA-F leads to better performance than the OCSA-
N because of the knowledge about the future electricity price.
However, the performance of OCSA-F depends heavily on the
accuracy of the forecasted electricity price. If the difference
between the forecasted electricity price and the real electricity
price increases, the performance of the OCSA-F may degrade
to the performance of OCSA-N. OCSA-N performs poorly
because the future electricity price is unknown to the charg-
ing stations. Also, the estimated wind power generation on
05/01/2018 is much lower than the real power generation.
Therefore, the charging stations purchase more power from the
grid at the current time slot without considering the electricity
price. By contrast, with the proposed formulation, we have a
trade-off term between the remaining charging demand and
the electricity cost. If the price is too high, the charging
stations therefore use the renewable energy to charge without
purchasing the external energy from the power grid.
B. QoS
Other than the electricity cost, we study the outcome of the
deadline selection game. First, we present the results of the
deadline selection game. We assume there is only one EV in
the charging station for ease of explanation. Let fi be 16, V2
be 250, and Bi,t be 10. Three different SOC, which are 0.52
9TABLE II
THE PROBABILITY OF SELECTING THE DEADLINE
17 : 30 17 : 45 18 : 00 18 : 15 18 : 30
Case 1 0 0 0.2610 0.7390 0
Case 2 0 0.3246 0.6754 0 0
Case 3 0.3483 0.6517 0 0 0
Case 2 0 0.3246 0.6754 0 0
Case 4 0 0 0.4466 0.5534 0
Case 5 0 0 0 0.2154 0.7846
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Fig. 3. Charging profile of the 14-th EV.
(Case 1), 0.64 (Case 2), and 0.73 (Case 3), are compared. We
then compare the influence of the value of virtual queue Bi,t.
Let fi be 16, V2 be 250, and SOCi,t be 0.64. Three different
virtual queue values, namely 10 (Case 2), 6.5 (Case 4), and
3.5 (Case 5), are discussed. The EV has five choices, namely
17 : 30, 17 : 45, 18 : 00, 18 : 15, and 18 : 30. The results are
provided in Table II.
From the results in Table II, it is clear that EV owners
postpone the deadline if they have low SOC right now. By
contrast, the EV owner wishes to leave the charging station
earlier if they have higher SOC at the current time slot. Thus,
EV owners have higher confidence to leave earlier if they are
at higher SOC. Next, we discuss the results of changing the
value of Bi,t. Under the same SOC, the EV owner with a
higher value of Bi,t would like to prepone the deadline. That
is, if the EV owners stay a long time in the charging station
without receiving power, the EV owner tends to leave earlier.
After showing the outcome of the deadline selection game,
we discuss its influence on the charging process. Therefore,
we need to detailly analyze the charging profile of the EV.
The charging profile of the 14-th EV is provided in Fig.3.
Here, we also compare the proposed method without deadline
selection game, which is EDF. OSCA-F has a similar charging
mechanism as OCSA-N, and thus the charging profile of
OSCA-F is omitted. The charging time of the 14-th EV is
8.75, 7.75, 6.75, and 5.75 hrs by utilizing OCCMA, OCSA-
N, proposed method, and EDF, respectively. We can observe
that the charging time of the proposed method is higher than
EDF but lower than OCCMA and OCSA-N. For both OCCMA
and OCSA-N, the EV keeps receiving power until the deadline
A
v
er
ag
e 
Q
o
S
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
OCCMA
Proposed
OCSA-F
OCSA-N
25 EV 50 EV 100 EV 200 EV
Fig. 4. Average QoS evaluation.
is reached; therefore, the charging time is long. In the EDF
method, the 14-th EV will be immediately charged after it
enters the charging station because it has an earlier deadline
than most of the EVs. However, for the proposed method, it
will postpone the charging task around 1 hour because some
EVs already have accumulative waiting time. Hence, the 14-th
EV needs to wait to receive the charging power.
We then evaluate the average QoS for the EV owners in
the charging stations in Fig. 4. According to the results, the
proposed algorithm can obtain 47.19% and 12.13% higher
QoS than the benchmarks, respectively. For the OCCMA, it
distributes the charging demands between ai and vi, such
that the charging tasks are finished just before the deadline.
In this case, the charging time is long, but the waiting is
short. By contrast, user satisfaction is used to schedule the
charging tasks without considering the cost in OCSA-N. By
using this algorithm, some EVs constantly receive the power,
but some need to wait a long time to get the power from
the charging station. The charging time of the OCSA-N thus
varies considerably. Then, the average QoS of the OCSA-F
lies between the OCCMA and the OCSA-N because of the
accuracy of the forecasted information as mentioned in Sec.
VI-A. Therefore, some EVs obtain high QoS but some EVs
have low QoS; however, the average QoS is still higher than
the OCCMA. If the forecasted information is accurate, the
average QoS of the OCSA-F will be the same as OCCMA. On
the other hand, the average QoS of the OCSA-F can approach
to the average QoS the OCSA-N if the forecasted information
is inaccurate. For the proposed method, we allow EVs to shift
their deadline, such that we can avoid the issue of a large
variance in charging time in the OSCA-N. That is why our
proposed method can obtain higher average QoS.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented an intelligent EV charging
management scheme for the charging stations in the trans-
portation system. By using the proposed method, we can
eliminate the negative impact of charging a large and rapidly
growing number of EVs in electric mobility to the power
grid. We modeled the interactions between the power grid and
charging stations as a stochastic game. We incorporated the
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dynamic behavior of EV owners in terms of their preference
or choice on charging parameters as another stochastic game.
We then proposed an online algorithm to approach the Nash
equilibria of both games. We utilized real data from California
Independent System Operator to evaluate the performance of
the proposed algorithm. The numerical results illustrated that
the proposed algorithm can achieve electricity cost very close
to the minimum electricity cost while also enhancing QoS
significantly.
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APPENDIX
A. Lyapunov Drift upper Bound in Cost Minimization Game
In (11), it contains two components, Qm,t and Zm,t. To get
the upper bound of (12), we derivate the upper bound of the
squared difference of each component separately. The detailed
derivation of the upper bound of Q2m,t+1 −Q2m,t is provided
as follow:
Q2m,t+1 = (max{Qm,t − cYm,t, 0}+ λm,t)2 (28a)
≤ (Qm,t − cYm,t)2 + 2λm,t (Qm,t − cYm,t) + λ2m,t
(28b)
≤ Q2m,t + 2cY 2m,t + λ2m,t + 2Qm,t (λm,t − cYm,t) (28c)
≤ Q2m,t + 2cY 2m,t + λmax
2
m,t + 2Qm,t
(
λmaxm,t − cYm,t
)
(28d)
In (28a), we square the both side of (9). Then, (28b) is obtained
by applying binomial theorem and max{a, 0}2 ≤ a2. By
neglecting the 2λm,tYm,t, we can get (28c). In the final, we
assign λm,t with λmaxm,t to get (28d).
Then, a similar calculation can be carried out for the deriva-
tion process of getting the upper bound of Z2m,t+1−Z2m,t. The
detailed derivation of the upper bound is provided as follow:
Z2m,t+1 = (max{Zm,t + ηmQm,t − cYm,t, 0})2 (29a)
≤ (Zm,t + ηmQm,t − cYm,t)2 (29b)
= Z2m,t+2Zm,t (ηmQm,t−cYm,t) + (ηmQm,t−cYm,t)2
(29c)
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B. Lyapunov Drift upper Bound in Deadline Selection Game
In this appendix, we aim to provide the derivation of the
upper bound of (18). Eq. (17) contains the summation of all
EVs in the charging station. However, it is easier to show
derivation with only one EV in the charging station. Therefore,
we can ignore the summation first. The detailed derivation of
the upper bound is provided as follow:
B2i,t+1
=
(
min
{
Bi,t+(SOC
fin
i −SOCi,t)
(
ωTi di−fj
)
, Bmax
})2
(30a)
≤ (Bi,t + (SOCfini − SOCi,t) (ωTi di − fj))2 (30b)
= B2i,t + (SOC
fin
i − SOCi,t)2
(
ωTi di − fi
)2
+ 2Bi,t(SOC
fin
i − SOCi,t)
(
ωTi di − fi
)
(30c)
≤ B2i,t +
(
ωTi di − fi
)2
+ 2Bi,t
(
ωTi di − fi
)
(30d)
We still square both side of (16) first. Then, the first inequality,
(30b), comes from the relation of min{a, b}2 ≤ a2. We use
binomial theorem to get (30c). In the final, (30d) is obtained
by assuming SOCfini − SOCi,t ≤ 1− SOCi,t.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Problem P1 is designed to minimize the drift bound, which
holds for all policies, including the optimal policy given in
(26). For notational simplicity, we assume V chargm is the same
for all charging stations. Let us define g(x) =
∑M
m=1 xm,t.
We then introduce the optimal solution to the right-hand side
of drift-plus-penalty term [30], [31] as
Lchargt+1 − Lchargt + V chargm ktg(x) ≤
1
2
M∑
m=1
λmax
2
m,t + J1(x
∗)|Qm,t,Ym,t,λm,t + c
∗
tV
charg
m . (31)
Taking expectation on both side of (31) and using iterated
expectation, we can get following relation
E
[
L
charg
t+1
]
− E
[
L
charg
t
]
+ V chargm E [ktg(x)] ≤ D + c∗tV chargm ,
(32)
where D is the constant in (31), and the optimal solution of x
makes the term related to the virtual queues be 0. The above
inequality holds for all t > 0. Therefore, we sum the above
equation from t = 0 to t = T , and then we can obtain
E
[
LchargT +1
]
− E
[
Lcharg0
]
+
T∑
t=1
V chargm E [ktg(x)]
≤ DT +
T∑
t=1
V chargm c
∗
t . (33)
As E[Lcharg0 ] = 0 and E[L
charg
T +1 ] > 0 , we divide V
charg
m
on both side and then we get the second inequality listed in
Theorem 1.
